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4The question of carbon emissions – how we 
manage, measure and hopefully reduce them – is 
central to the issues of climate change and global 
warming. The accountancy profession is gradually 
recognising that, if not already at the tipping 
point beyond which irreversible climate change 
will occur, then we are very nearly at that point, 
with inevitable costs for business and society. 
There is a major part for the profession to play in 
developing strategies and solutions in response to 
the carbon challenge.
This report highlights that businesses can’t evaluate the nature, extent and value 
of greenhouse gas emission-associated risks and opportunities until high-quality 
information is available. And this means an investment in credible and complete 
carbon accounting. 
Credible information on Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions allow a company to better 
understand what is happening inside its fences. But more significant is the carbon 
many businesses aren’t counting. Scope 3 emissions look across the full value 
chain. Measuring Scope 3 emissions provides the information needed to understand 
climate-related risks and opportunities upstream and downstream from operations, 
beyond operational boundaries and in the products and services developed and sold. 
Unfortunately, none of the many regulatory or voluntary accounting and reporting 
programmes require Scope 3 accounting and reporting. At best they make it optional 
and the reasons for this are understandable. There is the fear of double counting when 
the Scope 3 emissions for one organisation may be the Scope 1 emissions of another. 
There are also methodological difficulties and evidence gathering and quality issues 
are also a challenge. 
In reality, in 2009, 82% of the Global 500 responded to the Carbon Disclosure 
Project’s request for information. Forty-two percent provided information on their 
Scope 3 emissions. On the surface this may not sound too bad. But as our findings 
reveal, if you look more deeply it quickly becomes evident that some of this Scope 
3 reporting is of limited value. The fact that only six of the Global 500 companies 
reported on all five of the CDP’s Scope 3 emissions classes indicates that the field is 
wide open. There is lots of opportunity for market-leading innovation. 
Joining the low-carbon economy doesn’t happen by chance. It happens only when 
you have the right information to make the right decisions. Scope 3 is really about 
innovation and the future. It is about business remodelling rather than improved 
efficiency. It is not about doing what you do better, it is about understanding what and 
how to do things differently. Scope 1 and Scope 2 are about better. Scope 3 is about 
different. We need Scope 3 reporting if we are going to get beyond the efficiency drive 
to business remodelling.
Helen Brand
Chief executive, ACCA
Foreword
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Executive summary
ExECUTIvE SUMMARy
Despite widespread concern about climate change, government leaders 
have repeatedly failed to negotiate international binding agreements on 
policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This policy vacuum has 
made the role of business and markets increasingly important: the drive for 
value creation could be the key trigger for behavioural change leading to 
reduced emissions.
Formulating value-creating business 
strategies requires comprehensive and 
reliable information. If GHG emissions 
are to be managed, they must first be 
measured and reported. Accountants 
therefore have major roles to play in 
the analysis of GHG data, its reporting 
and incorporation into business strategy 
formulation. ACCA has a strong interest 
in enhancing understanding in these 
areas, thus supporting environmental 
accountability and long-term business 
sustainability.   
Methodologies for measuring and 
reporting on GHG emissions have 
developed significantly, but many 
organisations focus only on direct 
emissions (Scope 1) and emissions 
resulting from the generation of 
purchased electricity (Scope 2). Hardly 
any measure, let alone report, Scope 3 
emissions generated across the full value 
chain – upstream and downstream, 
including all elements of the supply 
chain – and emissions associated with a 
product’s use and end of life. 
This creates a huge knowledge gap. 
Research has suggested that Scope 3 
emissions could account for around 75% 
of an entity’s total GHG emissions.
Some companies, however, are using 
information gained from Scope 3 
analysis to develop new business 
strategies: not just finding efficiencies, 
but also identifying opportunities for new 
products or services that create genuine 
business value.
This report describes three different 
approaches companies are taking to 
Scope 3 emissions:
• The Control Approach: focusing on 
operational efficiencies in areas the 
business controls.
• The Influence Approach: seeing 
Scope 3 information as an important 
guide for improvement in areas 
where the business has high 
influence, such as the supply chain. 
Improvements focus on technology 
and improved efficiency, but include 
innovations in materials, processes, 
products and ways of doing 
business.
• The Engaged Approach: businesses 
bring an understanding of Scope 3 
emissions into all decision-making, 
identifying opportunities for 
innovation across the full value 
chain – internally, upstream and 
downstream. They look at how 
their products are made, used and 
disposed of.
Interest in Scope 3 emissions is set to 
increase. Formal guidance on Scope 3 
accounting and reporting, developed by 
the World Resources Institute and the 
World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, is expected to be 
published by Q4 2011. This ACCA report 
therefore provides a timely resource for 
all those with an interest in Scope 3 
reporting and reducing GHG emissions, 
including policymakers, regulators and 
standard setters, as well as business 
leaders, CSR, risk and environmental 
experts, accountants in business 
and practice. 
ACCA recommends action by all 
interested parties to encourage 
widespread use of Scope 3 reporting 
and so inspire new business insights 
and behaviours:  
• Governments, intergovernmental 
agencies, standard setters and 
policymakers should consider 
making Scope 3 reporting 
mandatory rather than voluntary.
• Businesses should begin to account 
for and report on Scope 3 emissions.
• Businesses should begin to include 
Scope 3 analysis in strategy 
development and in operational 
decision making and actions.
• Scope 3 information and analysis 
should begin to be brought into the 
investment appraisal process.
6everyone agrees that we need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. however, there is less 
agreement on how we achieve these reductions and the lack of coordinated public policy 
is symptomatic. 
The Un Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UnFCCC), whose 
role is to coordinate public policy on 
climate change internationally, has 
had limited success. Each year the 
UnFCCC convenes a conference of the 
parties (COP – all of the countries who 
have signed the Un climate change 
convention) to develop and agree on the 
policies and actions needed to combat 
climate change. 
At the 15th annual conference of the 
parties held in Copenhagen in December 
2009, the parties once again failed to 
negotiate a binding policy agreement 
– against a background of increasing 
urgency and high expectations. COP 16, 
held a year later in Cancun, Mexico, in 
late 2010 did not break the public policy 
log jam.
In this policy vacuum, the role of 
business and markets are becoming 
increasingly important. ‘As the dust 
settles on Copenhagen, we believe 
leadership from business is more critical 
than ever,’ notes The Carbon Trust.1
 
Given the lack of coherent public policy 
signals, a key element of this leadership 
will be finding ways to deliver carbon 
reductions that also deliver value within 
the context of the marketplace. If 
reductions are not going to be driven by 
regulators, companies need to find the 
business case; they need to find and take 
advantage of the value drivers. 
Finding these value drivers is not easy. It 
takes good information, innovative critical 
analysis and the ability to think outside 
of the ‘business as usual’ paradigm. It 
also requires looking at emissions across 
the full value chain. 
Delivering value from carbon
To find and deliver value by reducing 
carbon, companies need to take a 
long-term view. And they need to look at 
an increasingly broadening range of GHG 
risks and opportunities associated with 
concerns such as:
• security of supply and adaptation 
requirements where there is risk 
of climate impacts such as floods, 
drought, severe weather events and 
growing resource scarcity 
• material and process inputs and 
outputs such as electricity, water and 
waste where the associated GHG 
emissions are high
• supply chain emissions and supplier 
produced goods and services
• waste streams and waste disposal
• the transportation and distribution of 
goods and services 
• the use of products and services
• changing customer and consumer 
demands for products and services
• changing public policy and market 
dynamics
• reputation.
A better understanding of the risks and 
opportunities (including cost, taxation, 
regulation and revenue) associated with 
GHG emissions needs to be brought 
into the investment appraisal process to 
enable the development of strategies that 
will create value for organisations and 
their stakeholders.
1 www.carbontrust.co.uk
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‘those companies today that do measure and report their Scope 3 emissions tend to pick which 
activities to include in a piecemeal way (eg air travel but not employee commute), based on 
the ease of data capture, relevance to brand, or degree of control. this means that, despite 
the advancements in carbon disclosure, investors and others are forced to compare apples to 
oranges. while the numerator may look comparable, the hidden denominator (or boundary) varies 
drastically between companies.’ emma Stewart, environmental Leader, 26 February 2009
The dilemma is that you can’t start 
evaluating the nature, extent and 
value of GHG-associated risks and 
opportunities until you begin measuring 
your emissions. If businesses are going 
to show leadership they must clearly 
have the high-quality information 
needed to motivate the type and 
scale of action that will show that 
leadership. What this means is an 
investment in credible and complete 
carbon accounting. 
The first step to credible and complete 
carbon accounting is identifying and 
classifying GHG emissions. It is now 
accepted practice to classify GHG 
emissions as either direct emissions or 
indirect emissions. 
Direct emissions come from sources 
owned or controlled by an organisation 
– including emissions from boilers, 
furnaces and production processes. 
Indirect emissions are divided into two 
classes – those from purchased electricity 
and those from all other sources. These 
three different classes are referred to as 
Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. Credible 
information on Scope 1 and Scope 2 
emissions allow a company to better 
understand what is happening inside its 
fences. It provides information on what is 
happening at the plant or factory as well 
as how much electricity is being bought 
to keep the plant or factory operating. 
Scope 3 emissions look at emissions 
across the full value chain. Measuring 
Scope 3 emissions provides the 
information needed to understand 
climate-related risks and opportunities 
upstream and downstream from 
operations, beyond operational 
boundaries and in the products and 
services developed and sold. 
Scope 3 information that encompasses 
the full value chain may well challenge 
companies to look at what they are doing 
and not just how they are doing it. 
The value of this information, given the 
remaining methodological challenges, 
is most useful for what it reveals about 
the trends and scale of indirect carbon 
emissions. Leading companies have 
recognised this and are using Scope 
3 information in reaching far more 
wide-reaching strategic decisions. 
It may result in the decision to develop 
new products and services rather than 
simply more efficient ways to deliver 
existing products and services. It may 
result in the decision to substitute 
materials that are less carbon intensive. 
It may result in significant changes in 
the supply chain and new criteria for 
evaluating supply chain performance. 
It may result in new investments 
in low-carbon transport and waste 
management solutions. It will result 
in change.
ghg emiSSionS typeS
Scope 1: DiRect ghg emiSSionS
Direct GHG emissions occur from sources that are owned or controlled by 
the company.
Scope 2: eLectRicity inDiRect ghg emiSSionS
GHG emissions from the generation of purchased electricity consumed by the 
company. Purchased electricity is defined as electricity that is purchased or 
otherwise brought into the organisational boundary of the company. Scope 2 
emissions physically occur at the facility where electricity is generated.
Scope 3: otheR inDiRect ghg emiSSionS 
All other indirect emissions. Scope 3 emissions are a consequence of the 
activities of the company, but occur from sources not owned or controlled by 
the company. 
Accounting AnD RepoRting
Over the past 10 years the accounting 
and reporting of Scope 1 and Scope 2 
emissions has improved dramatically. 
This has been driven in part by 
regulatory requirements but also by 
the increasing recognition of the risks 
and opportunities associated with 
these GHG emissions. And while there 
remains some concern over the lack of 
harmonisation among regulatory and 
voluntary accounting and reporting 
requirements (a recent review by PwC 
for the Carbon Disclosure Standards 
Board identified 108 different reporting 
regimes), much has been achieved 
in the quest to develop credible and 
usable GHG accounting and reporting 
methodologies and standards.2 3  
Unfortunately, none of the many 
regulatory or voluntary accounting and 
reporting programmes require Scope 3 
accounting and reporting. At best they 
make it optional and the reasons for this 
are understandable. 
2 High-Impact Sectors: The Challenge of Reporting on Climate Change, ACCA and GRI December, 2009
3 Carbon Accounting, Accountancy Futures, Edition 01, ACCA, 2010
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First, there is the fear of double 
counting. This may occur when the 
accounts submitted by individual 
organisations are being aggregated to 
develop national or regional accounts. 
There is a clear risk of double counting 
when the Scope 3 emissions for one 
organisation may be the Scope 1 
emissions of another. 
Second, there are methodological 
difficulties. What categories of indirect 
emissions should be included? How 
do you draw the boundaries? Should 
lifecycle methodologies be adopted, and 
if so which ones? 
Third, there are evidence gathering and 
quality difficulties. If nobody is actually 
keeping this kind of data where do you 
start? Are estimates acceptable, and 
if so what estimation methodologies 
are acceptable? Are proxy indicators 
acceptable? What level of uncertainty 
is acceptable?
Many accounting and reporting 
programmes and requirements now 
reference a few key standards (see the 
Appendix for more detail), including the:
• ISO 14064 series 
• WBCSD/WRI GHG protocol 
and supplements
• CDSB reporting framework.
Perhaps the best-known public 
accounting and reporting programme 
and therefore the best public source of 
comparable GHG information is The 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). 
The CDP gathers comprehensive data 
annually from large corporations and now 
receives information from over 2,500 
companies. From this information it is 
clear that major corporations are now 
accounting and reporting on Scope 1 
and 2 emissions but not on Scope 3 
emissions. 
In 2009, 409 (82%) of the Global 
500 responded to CDP’s request for 
information. However, only 209 (42%) 
provided any information on their Scope 
3 emissions. On the surface this may not 
sound too bad. It appears that about half 
of those responding are also providing 
Scope 3 information. However, if you 
look more deeply it quickly becomes 
evident that some of this Scope 3 
reporting is of limited value. This is 
clearly evident in the CDP data. CDP 
splits Scope 3 accounting and reporting 
into five classes: 
• employee business travel
• external distribution and logistics
• the use and disposal of the company’s 
products and services
• the company’s supply chain
• other.
the cARbon DiScLoSuRe 
pRoJect
The Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) was launched in 2000 to 
collect and distribute high-quality 
information to motivate investors, 
corporations and governments to 
take action to prevent dangerous 
climate change.
2,500 organisations in some 
60 countries around the world 
now measure and disclose their 
greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change strategies through 
CDP. This data is made available 
for use by a wide audience 
including institutional investors, 
corporations, policymakers and 
their advisors, public sector 
organisations, government bodies, 
academics and the public.
CDP acts on behalf of 475 
institutional investors, holding 
$55 trillion in assets under 
management and some 60 
purchasing organisations.
ChArT 2: CDP SCOPE 3 rEPOrTING:
NUMBEr OF CLASSES rEPOrTED
6
16
40
49
981 CLASS
2 CLASSES
3 CLASSES
4 CLASSES
5 CLASSES
nUMBER OF COMPAnIES
how mAny cLASSeS oF Scope 3 RepoRting Do 
compAnieS RepoRt on? 
(291 compAnieS out oF the gLobAL 500 compAnieS 
Do not RepoRt Any Scope 3 emiSSionS)
number of classes 
reported on
number 
reporting
% of global 
500
5 6 1.2
4 16 3.2
3 40 8
2 49 9.8
1 98 19.6
Total reporting on 
Scope 3 209 41.8
Total reporting at 
useful level (three or 
more classes
62 12.4
ChArT 1: CDP SCOPE 3 rEPOrTING
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43%
23%
30%
ChArT 4: CDP 2009 SCOPE 3 rEPOrTING:
 ThOSE WhO DO rEPOrT
209 of the 500 companies 
report Scope 3 emissions, 
of which:
43%  reported on one class
23%  reported on two 
classes
30%  reported on three or 
more classes.
Of the 500 companies:
12%  reported on three 
or more classes of 
Scope 3 emissions 
– considered as 
a useful level of 
reporting
88%  do not provide 
complete information 
on Scope 3 
emissions.
12%
88%
ChArT 3: CDP 2009 SCOPE 3 rEPOrTING:
 OVErVIEW
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Of the 209 companies that reported 
Scope 3 emissions, 98 of them reported 
on only one of these five classes of 
emission. Another 49 reported on two 
classes. That leaves only 62 (12.4%) of 
the 500 companies reporting on three 
or more of the five classes and therefore 
providing information that comes 
anywhere close to being complete. In 
fact, only 6 or 1.2% of the Global 500 
companies reported on all five CDP 
classes of Scope 3 emissions.
In addition to soliciting and making 
available information on GHG emissions, 
CDP also scores the quality of the 
information submitted by companies. 
They publish this as the Carbon 
Disclosure Leadership Index (CDLI). 
Since full disclosure of carbon emissions 
is the purpose of CDP, one would expect 
that those who score highest on this 
index would also be those who disclose 
Scope 3 emissions most fully. 
4 CDP CDLI, 2009 
While the percentage of the top 14 
rated companies reporting on Scope 3 
emissions is higher than the percentage 
for the Global 500 (13 of the 14 top 
companies, or 92% as opposed to 209 
or 42% of the Global 500), disclosure 
among this elite group is not as uniformly 
complete. 
As Chart 5 shows, only two of the top 
14 report on all five classes. Two more 
report on four, three more report on 
three, three more report on two and 
three more report on one. That means 
that seven (50%) of the top 14 provide 
adequate Scope 3 information, which is 
much better than the 62 (12.4%) for the 
full global 500, and is a good indication 
of why they are at the top of the table. 
But perhaps more interesting is that the 
4th best reporting company, Wal-Mart, 
did not report Scope 3 data. If the 
purpose of the CDP is ‘to collect and 
distribute high-quality information to 
motivate investors, corporations and 
governments to take action to prevent 
dangerous climate change4’ we then 
need to understand what has Wal-Mart 
done to earn a 4th place ranking out 
of 500?
It is clear that Scope 3 emissions are the 
carbon we are not counting. So why does 
it matter that only 12.4% of the global 
500 are reporting any useful Scope 3 
information?  
Researchers at Carnegie Mellon 
University said in a 2008 report that 
two-thirds of US industries would 
overlook 75 percent of GHG emissions 
if they neglect reporting on tier three 
emissions. 
company cDp 
score
Scope 3 
classes 
reported
Bayer 95 5
BASF 94 4
HSBC 92 2
Wal-Mart 89 0
Chevron 88 2
Cisco 88 1
PG&E 88 1
Public Service 88 3
Spectra 88 1
Bank of Montreal 87 3
Boeing 87 2
Carnival 87 3
Rio Tinto 87 5
Samsung 87 4
ChArT 5: TOP 14 SCOrErS IN ThE 
2009 CDP
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McKinsey, looking only at the supply 
chain side, has stated that ‘for consumer 
goods makers, high-tech players, and 
other manufacturers, between 40 and 
60 percent of a company’s carbon 
footprint resides upstream in its supply 
chain – from raw materials, transport, 
and packaging to the energy consumed 
in manufacturing processes. For retailers, 
the figure can be 80 percent5.’ 
If business is going to show carbon 
leadership, it is going to have to 
understand and develop innovative 
strategic responses to a complete carbon 
emissions profile. Focusing only on 
Scope 1 and Scope 2, which typically 
includes only what is inside the factory 
fence, is no longer going to be enough. 
The companies that succeed in the 
low-carbon economy will be those with 
the information they need to move ahead 
of their competitors. 
The opposite of this also holds in that 
a lack of good Scope 3 emissions 
accounting may well represent a 
significant block to innovation for many 
companies. The fact that only six of 
the Global 500 companies reported on 
all five of the CDPs Scope 3 emissions 
classes indicates that the field is wide 
open. There is lots of opportunity for 
market-leading innovation.
And here there is a role for accountants. 
Accountants do not simply produce 
reliable information and report on it. 
They must also analyse and understand 
the importance of that information 
so that it is included in strategic and 
operational decision making.
value chain Upstream Operations Downstream
GHG Scope 2 and 3 Scope 1 Scope 3
ChArT 6: GhG EMISSIONS IN rELATION TO ThE VALUE ChAIN
ghg emiSSionS in ReLAtion to 
the vALue chAin
It is useful to consider the different 
classes of GHG emissions in relation to 
the value chain (see chart 6). 
Scope 1 emissions typically occur in this 
middle or operational part of the value 
chain. 
Scope 2 emissions typically occur in the 
supply chain. But Scope 2 emissions 
only represent a small part of supply 
chain emissions. The larger part of 
supply chain emissions are Scope 3. 
Scope 3 emissions occur across all parts 
of the value chain and are especially 
prevalent upstream and downstream.
The companies that have not scored 
well on the CD Leaders’ Index and that 
have not reported on Scope 3 emissions 
have essentially reported on and have 
strategies only for the middle part of the 
value chain, that is, operations within 
their fences. They have not looked at 
emissions upstream or downstream. 
If we accept that these upstream 
and downstream emissions represent 
upwards of 75% of an organisation’s 
carbon emissions then we must question 
how this lack of information has affected 
their strategic and operational decision 
making and innovation. 
But while we must question it we must 
also acknowledge the reasons why many 
companies choose not to account for 
Scope 3 emissions. First there are the 
methodological challenges mentioned 
earlier. These methodological challenges 
contribute to the resource issue. It costs 
money to gather and analyse information 
that is difficult to gather and analyse. 
And if the benefit of gathering that 
information is not immediately obvious it 
can be difficult to justify the investment. 
Companies may also consider the sector 
they are in, their geographical location, 
and the maturity of understanding 
in their sector and region in relation 
to the opportunity for using Scope 
3 information as a way to develop 
competitive advantage.  
It is also true that different types of 
companies and different sectors have 
very different levels of involvement in 
and influence over different parts of the 
value chain. A company that produces 
chocolate has high upstream impact but 
relatively low downstream impact. you 
buy a chocolate bar, you eat it, the life of 
the product is over. On the other hand, a 
company that produces washing powder 
has a much different downstream 
profile. A significant source of energy use 
associated with the product occurs when 
the consumer uses it at home. Some 
companies may logically choose to invest 
in those areas – operations, upstream 
or downstream – where their impact 
is highest. 
5 McKinsey Quarterly 1 July 2008
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ExxonMobil, for example, did not report 
on Scope 3 and scored 62 on the CD 
Leaders’ Index. Their position is that 
they have little influence or control over 
the use of their products downstream. 
Spectra Energy on the other hand, a 
young Canadian Oil and Gas company 
that is much more directly involved in 
downstream activities, did report on 
Scope 3 emissions and scored 88 on the 
CD Leaders’ Index. 
Wal-Mart scored 88 on the CD Leaders’ 
Index without reporting Scope 3 
emissions data. They have, however, 
reported on Scope 3 research that they 
have done. As a consequence, they have 
begun to include Scope 3 concerns in 
their upstream supply chain strategy 
development and decision making. And 
this they did report on.
Bayer leads the CD Leaders’ Index with 
a score of 95. We would expect them 
to be exemplary. And in many ways 
they are. They report on all CDP classes 
of Scope 3 emissions and have a core 
strategy that is heavily influenced by their 
understanding of carbon emissions. 
These companies represent different 
approaches to carbon strategy. The 
difference in each approach is associated 
with the way in which they understand 
and approach Scope 3 emissions.
The first approach, the Control 
Approach, focuses on improved 
operational efficiency in areas that it 
has control over. This approach focuses 
on technological innovation within 
operations, where they feel they can 
generate the most value. 
The second approach, the Influence 
Approach, acknowledges the importance 
of Scope 3 information as a guide to 
areas for improvement where there are 
high levels of influence, such as the 
supply chain. Improvements focus on 
technology and improved efficiency but 
also include innovations in materials, 
processes, products and ways of doing 
business. 
The third approach, the Engaged 
Approach, requires engagement across 
the full value chain. It brings an 
understanding of Scope 3 emissions 
into all decision making. It requires 
the identification of opportunities 
for innovation and taking advantage 
of business opportunities in a 
carbon-constrained economy to benefit 
significantly from understanding Scope 3 
emissions, not just within their own 
operations but across the full value chain 
in the sectors in which it operates. 
TThe carbon we’re not counting
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The Control Approach
A recent research study by McKinsey6  
looked at what actions would be needed 
to get to 450ppm or no more than a 
2oC change – the threshold we need to 
achieve in order to avoid catastrophic 
climate change. 
It considers over 200 greenhouse 
gas abatement opportunities across 
10 sectors in 21 world regions. And 
it concludes that it is just possible to 
achieve the threshold if we start now 
and if everybody does all of them. But 
even for this to happen, the remaining 
4% of action must come from ill-defined 
behaviour change and not operational 
efficiencies. 
McKinsey concludes that: ‘Capturing 
enough of this potential to stay below 
the two degrees Celsius threshold will be 
highly challenging however. Our research 
finds not only that all regions and sectors 
would have to capture close to the full 
potential for abatement that is available 
to them; even deep emissions cuts in 
some sectors will not be sufficient. Action 
also needs to be timely. A 10-year delay 
in taking abatement action would make 
it virtually impossible to keep global 
warming below two degrees Celsius’.
The report also concludes that the level 
of investment required, approximately 
five to six percent BAU investment in 
fixed assets, is possible. 
However, given the demonstrated lack 
of political leadership, as demonstrated 
at COP 15 in Copenhagen in December 
2009, this level of coordinated 
investment and collaborative change is 
unlikely to happen. There is no evidence 
that this scenario can be achieved. 
Waiting 10 years to start will make their 
scenario highly improbable. Having no 
internationally agreed policy and no 
regulatory mechanisms to enforce action 
across the board will make it impossible. 
Had Copenhagen worked, depending 
only on efficiency measures was a 
doubtful strategy. Post Copenhagen, 
focusing only on efficiency measures is 
a trap that will potentially keep us from 
achieving the level of change required.
At the moment many companies – like 
ExxonMobil – continue to focus primarily 
on looking for greater operational 
efficiencies and technological fixes within 
their fences. This is necessary, but is it 
sufficient? 
ExxonMobil is a very successful company 
with an excellent record of technological 
innovation. It sets the industry 
benchmark for operational efficiency. 
After choosing not to participate 
in the CDP for a number of years, 
when it did decide to do so, it did so 
comprehensively, providing very credible 
data. And yet, in spite of providing a 
lengthy and detailed Carbon Disclosure 
report, it has only scored 62 on the CDP 
Leaders’ Index. 
ExxonMobil does not report Scope 
3 emissions. Its position is that 
Scope 3 reporting should be a 
conditional question.
exxonmobil 2009 cDp accounting 
and reporting
Scope 1  131,000,000
Scope 2 14,000,000
Scope 3 0
Total Scope 1 & 2 145,000,000
ExxonMobil plays to its existing 
strengths and focuses on operations and 
technology. It does recognise a range of 
risks associated with GHG emissions. 
However, many of these are regulatory 
and political. 
value chain Upstream Operations Downstream
GHG Scope 2 and 3 Scope 1 Scope 3
ChArT 7: ThE CONTrOL APPrOACh
the control Approach focuses on the middle part of the value chain and therefore focuses on 
looking for ways to improve operational efficiency. improved efficiency is a necessary condition 
for achieving the progress we need to make against climate change, but is it a sufficient one? 
6 Pathways to a Low-Carbon Economy: Version 2 of the Global Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve, McKinsey & Company, 2009
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The Influence Approach
In addition they look at two types of 
environmental risk. First, the potential 
risk to their operations caused by 
changes in climate. Second, the risks to 
society and ecosystems. 
The environmental risks to operations 
that they identify are limited to severe 
weather events that may disrupt supplies 
or interrupt the operations of ExxonMobil 
facilities. Their approach to managing 
these risks is the business as usual 
strategy that they have been following 
for years. Innovation is management 
systems and technology-based and has 
little to do with their business model, the 
products they produce, or how they are 
used – the upstream and downstream 
parts of the value chain.  
Scope 3 emissions look at emissions across the full value chain – upstream and downstream. 
this can be a daunting and potentially expensive task. So it is natural to ask: ‘where can i get 
the best leverage, quickly?’ For many companies this means looking upstream at the supply 
chain where, because of financially based business relations, they have significant influence.
TThe Control Approach
Exxon is very good at what it does. 
It has systematically worked to 
improve efficiency and environmental 
performance throughout its facilities 
worldwide. Since 2000, it has identified 
ways to improve energy efficiency at its 
refineries and chemical plants by 15 to 
20 percent. It has invested more than 
$5 billion in natural gas utilisation and 
commercialisation projects that will help 
reduce the routine flaring of natural gas 
that is a by-product of oil production. 
ExxonMobil also recognises that risks 
to society and ecosystems could be 
significant. They do accept that any 
approach to meeting the world’s growing 
energy needs will incorporate strategies 
to address the risk of climate change. 
They recognise that there are two 
things that need to be done: to stabilise 
emissions at a level that will reduce the 
risk of severe climate change, and to 
invest in adaptation strategies – those 
strategies that will allow us to respond 
effectively to climate changes. 
Exxon’s strategy is based on their view 
that oil and gas will be part of the energy 
mix for a long time to come – even as 
its share of the energy market declines. 
Their strategy is to be the leading player 
in a declining market. For ExxonMobil, 
the conclusion behind their existing 
strategy is that Scope 3 emissions 
information is not material. 
Chart 8 on page 14 illustrates the 
Influence Approach, acknowledging the 
importance of Scope 3 information as a 
guide to areas for improvement where 
there are high levels of influence, such 
as the supply chain. Improvements focus 
on technology and improved efficiency 
but also include innovations in materials, 
processes, products and ways of 
doing business. 
Many companies also have a long history 
of working with suppliers to achieve 
improvements in a wide range of areas. 
So there are existing relationships 
and mechanisms in place that lend 
themselves to jointly addressing GHG 
emissions. In fact, much work on 
sustainability or CSR issues in general 
has, over the past 20 years, focused 
on supply chain performance. There is 
a deep understanding of supply chain 
dynamics and mechanisms and systems. 
Choosing to focus upstream also has an 
unquestionable multiplier effect. This is 
especially important when the task ahead 
of us is so great and the need to go to 
scale so urgent. Wal-Mart for example 
has more than 100,000 suppliers. The 
immediate impact of influencing the 
actions of this many other companies 
can be enormous.  
14
The Influence ApproachT
Wal-Mart’s ranking in CDP 2009 raises 
questions since they have not reported 
on Scope 3 emissions. At 89, Wal-Mart 
had the 4th highest score of the Global 
500 and yet it did not report any 
Scope 3 emissions data. 
The explanation comes through an 
analysis of their work on GHG emissions 
in their supply chain. They have reported 
significant activity with their supply 
chain. One would expect that in order to 
make the decision to invest in this way 
they would have supporting data and 
analyses. They may well have. But they 
have chosen not to report it at this time. 
They are making decisions about 
upstream GHG-associated risks and 
opportunities as if they had Scope 3 data 
and yet, if they have it, they have chosen 
not to report it. The table below outlines 
what Wal-Mart has accounted for and 
reported on.
wal-mart 2009 cDp accounting 
and reporting
Scope 1  5,566,006
Scope 2 15,500,950
Scope 3 0
Total Scope 1 & 2 21,066,956
Although Wal-Mart has not reported on 
its Scope 3 emissions it has qualified 
this. It states that it recognises the 
importance of supply chain carbon 
management and has been engaging 
its suppliers on sustainability since 
2005. It further states that although the 
company is not reporting supply chain 
emissions for 2008, using preliminary 
macro-economic assessments, it believes 
that its supply chain is likely to have an 
annual carbon footprint that is at least 
100 times greater than its total Scope 1 
and 2 emissions. 
Wal-Mart recognises the significance 
of Scope 3 emissions. It has studied 
them in some detail but does not yet 
feel it is in a position to report credible 
data. It is, however, willing to state an 
estimate of the scale of the emissions. 
This is very important because this 
information has begun to influence the 
decisions it makes. Wal-Mart’s strategy 
is using its market position to influence 
the product innovation and better 
environmental performance up and down 
its supply system.
Wal-Mart also states that in future it 
will account for and report on Scope 3 
emissions for the up and downstream 
components of its business, since they 
are, as they say, critical elements of 
the retail value chain and represent 
additional opportunities to manage 
carbon emissions.
This strategy of concentrating on the 
supply chain has resulted in a number 
of successes. 
Wal-Mart first began following this 
pathway when it began to look at 
packaging. It was motivated by the need 
to reduce cost and reducing packaging 
was a way to reduce cost. In the process 
it found it was easier to talk about 
sustainability than about cost reductions. 
There were sustainability benefits as 
well as cost benefits. It had found a 
market driver and began to look for more 
sustainability benefits. 
Much of the strategy is focused on 
improved efficiency within its supply 
chain. To an extent this simply pushes 
the improved efficiency strategy down 
the chain. Is it really a strategy that 
addresses the fundamental changes 
demanded by the low-carbon economy? 
At the beginning, perhaps not. But the 
process that Wal-Mart has initiated in its 
supply chain appears to have created a 
sense of partnership that has now moved 
into more interesting areas of product 
suitability and design. As lifecycle 
analysis begins to penetrate this process 
of product analysis we can hope to see 
more significant innovation.
ChArT 8: ThE INFLUENCE APPrOACh
value chain Upstream Operations Downstream
GHG Scope 2 and 3 Scope 1 Scope 3
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ChArT 9: ThE ENGAGED APPrOACh
value chain Upstream Operations Downstream
GHG Scope 2 and 3 Scope 1 Scope 3
How a company looks both upstream 
and downstream is illustrated in Chart 9. 
A company will look at how its products 
are used and how they are disposed of. 
In short, it will look at its full lifecycle. 
This is where significant innovation and 
new opportunity begins to appear. 
Focusing upstream on your suppliers 
can simply be a process of transferring 
operational efficiencies from your 
factory to your suppliers’ factories. But 
when you begin to look more closely at 
how products are used, how long they 
are used for, what energy and other 
resources are required for their continued 
use, how they are disposed of and the 
impact of the materials they contain at 
the time of disposal, you begin to get a 
truer and fuller picture of the impact of 
your organisation and its products and 
services. This fuller picture will typically 
make significant opportunities for 
impact-reducing innovations apparent. 
And very often these innovations are step 
changes and not incremental changes 
such as those typically achieved through 
efficiency gains.
The Engaged Approach
Earlier is this report we discussed 
ExxonMobil. It is an extractive industry 
and part of the old economy. But we 
should not accept that these older sectors 
of the economy cannot innovate as well. 
Spectra Energy is a young Canadian Oil 
and Gas company that operates very 
differently than ExxonMobil. It scored 88 
on the Carbon Disclosure Leaders’ Index. 
It is a different type of energy company. 
Spectra has begun to account for and 
report on its Scope 3 emissions and 
plans to do this more systematically in 
the future. Its future strategy is to fully 
define Scope 3 emissions associated with 
Spectra Energy. It will:
• identify and prioritise key Scope 3 
emission areas – where the scale of 
emissions is material, areas of Scope 
3 emissions that are important to the 
business (for example consumption 
of natural gas by customers), areas 
of emissions that are important to 
customers and other stakeholders
• identify where access to information 
is available, and begin calculation 
of emissions (eg demand-side 
management, employee travel)
• identify areas where information is 
required, formulate an action plan and 
timeline to gather information 
• evaluate areas where there is potential 
to influence emission reductions.
Spectra’s strategy is very different to 
ExxonMobil’s. In the context of the 
energy sector as a whole and not just 
from the point of view of exploiting 
the opportunities associated with oil 
and gas, it has built a strategy and 
business model that actively pursues 
downstream opportunities. It addresses 
consumer demand risks by investing in 
and providing innovative energy services 
that complement its core operations, 
generate supplemental sources of 
revenue, and help make customers more 
competitive while reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. And it is improving 
its understanding of how its existing 
skills and facilities can contribute to 
the success of its customers in three 
main areas:
• providing demand-side management 
programmes that help retail, 
commercial and industrial customers 
use energy more efficiently
• selling operating services and 
supplying waste heat from existing 
facilities to customers so they can 
generate and sell near zero-emission 
electricity
• capturing and sequestering naturally 
occurring carbon dioxide contained 
in customers’ natural gas, enabling 
them to sell gas that could not be sold 
unprocessed.
Looking upstream and using influence where it exists is better than only looking at operations 
and those things you can control, but it is still only part of the picture. A company that seeks to 
fully understand its impact will begin to engage downstream.
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Bayer is right at the top of the CD 
Leaders’ Index with a score of 95. This 
successful company has reported on 
all CDP areas of Scope 3 emissions 
and has built the reduction of carbon 
emissions into the very core of its 
business strategy. Bayer goes well 
beyond risk identification and mitigation. 
To a large extent its strategy is built on 
climate-related opportunities. It knows 
what the numbers are and have a sound 
foundation for innovation and strategic 
decision making. 
bayer 2009 cDp accounting 
and reporting
Scope 1  4,000,000
Scope 2 3,570,000
Scope 3 21,900,000
Total Scope 1 & 2 7,570,000
Scope 3 as % of total 74.3
These numbers are consistent with the 
example of typical emissions published 
in the Scope 3 supplement to the GHG 
protocol published by WBCSD and 
WRI (see Appendix B). Close to 75% of 
emissions are Scope 3 (see Chart 10).
In its CDP report, Bayer has stated that 
it: ‘considers climate change one of 
today’s megatrends. The identification of 
opportunities arising from this trend is an 
integral part of Bayer’s strategy process. 
Climate change-related opportunities 
are identified and substantiated at the 
subgroup and business unit level and 
then assessed from the perspective 
of the Bayer Group as a whole. In 
parallel, the Bayer Climate Programme 
Steering Committee identifies business 
opportunities and connects different 
subgroups and business units in case 
of opportunities that apply to several 
organisational units in the Bayer group. 
The Bayer Climate Programme Steering 
Committee is led by Dr Wolfgang 
Plischke, the member of the Board of 
Management responsible for Innovation, 
Technology and Environment.’
Bayer has made a huge investment in 
carbon-related R&D. It has set aside 
€1bn in its budget for investment in 
climate-related R&D and other projects 
between 2008 and 2010.
Bayer has positioned itself over the past 
few years as a ‘climate solution provider’, 
while at the same time delivering a 
contribution to the reduction of GHG 
emissions. The climate change-related 
business opportunities have particularly 
been identified in Bayer subgroups 
and service companies: Bayer Material 
Science, Bayer Crop Science and Bayer 
Technology Services are able to benefit 
the most from the mitigation and 
adaptation requirements that arise in 
the market. 
Across all GHG-emitting sectors 
(buildings, transport, power, industry 
and agriculture/forestry), Bayer provides 
‘climate solutions’ that reduce GHG 
emissions and thus help to mitigate 
the impact of climate change. For 
example, about 20% of Bayer Material 
Science revenue comes from climate 
change-related business (ie about €2bn 
in 2008). 
The building sector contributes 21% to 
global GHG emissions (including energy 
supplied by power sector). Bayer has 
developed ‘climate solutions’ bundled in 
Bayer’s project ‘EcoCommercial Building’ 
(ECB), which is a global concept 
for climate-friendly commercial and 
industrial buildings. 
The transport sector contributes 14% 
to global GHG emissions. With its 
products, Bayer addresses two major 
abatement levers in the transport 
sector: ‘lightweighting’ and biofuels. 
Bayer products include: lighweighting 
materials in car manufacturing, plant 
protection products for energy crops, and 
high-yielding varieties for the production 
of biofuels. 
The industry sector contributes 34% 
to global GHG emissions. Bayer offers 
products that reduce emissions of 
production processes (eg ultraviolet 
coatings) and that contribute towards 
a ‘greener’ supply chain (eg natural 
oil polyols).
The power sector contributes 24% to 
global GHG emissions. Bayer is actively 
supporting the expansion of renewable 
energies, including the development of 
carbon nanotubes for wind power and 
polyurethanes for photovoltaic modules 
and mounting systems.
The agriculture/forestry sector contributes 
31% to global GHG emissions. Bayer is 
currently working on new products and 
services in the fields of stress tolerance 
and carbon sequestration. 
Beyond these examples, Bayer has 
a pipeline of products at different 
stages of development, all providing 
solutions to help customers increase 
their energy efficiency or reduce their 
carbon footprint. 
ChArT 10: ExAMPLE GhG EMISSIONS ACrOSS A PrODUCT’S LIFECyCLE
  Raw material 
acquisition and 
pre-processing
  Production
  Distribution and retail
  Use
  End of life 0 20 40 60 80 100
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Joining the low-carbon economy
when we combine the lack of political leadership with the clear evidence provided by mcKinsey 
that the technological fix is not going to get us where we need to go it is clear that business 
must take the lead in inventing the low-carbon economy and that a credible and complete 
carbon accounting that includes a full Scope 3 inventory is an essential ingredient in the 
business decision making and innovation process. it is equally clear that the people with the 
skills to account for and analyse carbon emissions have an important role to play. 
A low-carbon economy (also called 
a ‘green economy’) is an economy 
that has a minimal output of GHG 
emissions. The aim of a low-carbon 
economy is to integrate all aspects, 
from manufacturing, agriculture, 
transportation and power-generation, 
around processes and approaches that 
use and produce energy and materials 
with little GHG emission. The low-carbon 
economy typically has a number of 
principles underlying it7:
• All waste should be minimised – 
reduce, reuse, recycle.
• Energy should be produced using 
no or low-carbon energy sources 
and methods – renewable and 
alternative energy sources, fuels and 
sequestration.
• All resources (in particular energy) 
should be used efficiently – more 
efficient energy conversion devices, 
combined heat and power.
• Wherever practical, local needs should 
be served by local production – food, 
materials, energy.
• There is high awareness and 
compliance with environmental and 
social responsibility initiatives – 
industry, commerce and individuals.
The Un Green Economy Initiative (GEI) 
– designed to assist governments in 
‘greening’ their economies by reshaping 
and refocusing policies, investments and 
spending says that: 
‘A Green Economy is characterised by 
substantially increased investments 
in economic sectors that build on and 
enhance the earth’s natural capital 
or reduce ecological scarcities and 
environmental risks. These sectors 
include renewable energy, low-carbon 
transport, energy-efficient buildings, 
clean technologies, improved waste 
management, improved freshwater 
provision, sustainable agriculture and 
forest management, and sustainable 
fisheries. These investments are driven by 
or supported by national policy reforms 
and the development of international 
policy and market infrastructure.’
What is needed is the: ‘reconfiguration 
of businesses, infrastructure and 
institutions, and the adoption of 
sustainable consumption and production 
processes. Such reconfiguration leads 
to a higher share of green sectors 
contributing to GDP, greener jobs, 
lower energy and resource-intensive 
production, lower waste and pollution, 
and significantly lower greenhouse 
gas emissions. It can also assist in 
the reduction of persistent poverty 
through targeted wealth transfers, new 
employment, as well as improvements 
in access and the flow of ecosystem 
goods and services to the bottom of the 
economic pyramid.’8
In an article in the Guardian on 2 July 
2009, Tom Delay, CEO of Carbon Trust 
summed up the challenge well when 
he wrote that: ‘This year is the 300th 
anniversary of the first industrial revolution 
which brought in the age of fossil fuels. 
In 1709 Abraham Darby successfully 
smelted iron with coke near Ironbridge, 
an innovation which led to iron-making 
on a massive scale, changing the lives of 
millions of people and helping to create 
the modern industrial world.
‘We now face a similar game changing 
challenge. We need to unleash a new 
revolution that fast tracks the deployment 
of a new set of technologies – low-carbon 
ones. This requires a faster acceleration 
in innovation and technological 
development than we witnessed 300 
years ago. This new low-carbon economy 
is poised to be the mother of all markets 
and will be as transformative in its 
impact as the first industrial revolution. It 
offers a huge commercial opportunity.’
An understanding of Scope 3 emissions 
is essential to this new revolution. We 
need to invent not just the technology 
but the business models that will get us 
there. Bruno Berthon, managing director 
of Accenture’s Sustainability Services 
Group, recently suggested some potential 
new business models in an article in 
Business Week9. He has suggested that 
four interesting business models are 
being explored, and that a low-carbon 
future probably requires a combination 
all of them. 
the clean energy model
Replacing fossil fuels with clean energy 
at a scale that supports economic 
growth. Combined with more energy 
efficiency, this model will certainly 
contribute to the journey towards 
low-carbon heaven, but will hardly 
be sufficient.
the ecological industry model
Reinventing industry based on a set 
of low-carbon constraints, through a 
combination of energy efficiency and 
product/process innovation. This model is 
capable of integrating renewable energy 
into the design of new industrial capacity. 
7 www.lowcarboneconomy.com/LCE/AboutALowCarbonEconomy 
8 Green Economy Report: A Preview, UnEP, 2010 
9 www.businessweek.com/careers/managementiq/archives/2009/12/new_business_mo.html 
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the services model
A services economy, where ownership 
of the product ideal is replaced by a 
combination of new uses and service 
offerings: car sharing for example or 
industrial models sell a service without 
the product, like a decontamination 
process instead of chemical solvents. 
the functional model
Where the function is what matters and 
can be fulfilled as long as it provides the 
intended needs: from functional foods to 
virtual travel, from digital communities 
to functional clothing. It aims to provide 
the same sensations and fulfil the same 
consumer needs without the recourse to 
a physical structure or media. 
What is particularly interesting about the 
last three models is that they propose 
a joint transformation of the supply 
and demand side instead of a cleaner 
‘business as usual’ state in the first 
instance. 
The clean energy model is what I have 
referred to as the efficiency approach. It 
is necessary but not sufficient. At the end 
of the day it is simply a cleaner version 
of business as usual. To develop business 
models that also address the need for 
change on the supply and demand side 
– in other words across the value chain 
– you need the Scope 3 information that 
can support that transformation. 
Joining the low-carbon economy doesn’t 
happen by chance. It happens only when 
you have the right information to make 
the right decisions. 
Scope 3 is really about innovation 
and the future. It is about business 
remodelling rather than improved 
efficiency. It is not about doing what 
you do better, it is about understanding 
what and how to do things differently. 
Scope 1 and Scope 2 are about better. 
Scope 3 is about different. And that 
is because by looking at the full value 
chain it challenges you in relation to 
a much broader context. We need 
Scope 3 reporting if we are going to get 
beyond the efficiency drive to business 
remodelling. 
RecommenDAtionS
For governments and standards setters 
Governments, intergovernmental 
agencies and other standards and policy 
setters should consider making Scope 3 
mandatory.
Standards setters and others who 
contribute to public policy should 
consider making Scope 3 reporting 
mandatory rather than voluntary as it 
currently is in most schemes.
For business 
Business should begin to account for and 
report on Scope 3 emissions. 
Scope 3 information and analysis 
should begin to be included in strategy 
development and in operational decisions 
and actions. 
Scope 3 information and analysis should 
begin to be brought into the investment 
appraisal process.
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T APPENDIx A: PrACTICAL GUIDANCE FOr SCOPE 3 ACCOUNTING AND rEPOrTING
Companies, investors and other stakeholders have called for standard 
approaches to accounting and reporting of Scope 3 emissions due to 
the wide variety of emissions sources, calculation methods and lack of 
consistency of approach in Scope 3 accounting.
The primary voluntary accounting and reporting standards are the: 
• ISO 14064 series 
• WBCSD/WRI GHG protocol 
• CBSD reporting framework. 
In addition, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) provides guidance on 
how to report on Scope 3 emissions in order to respond to its annual 
questionnaire.
In all of these, accounting for and reporting on Scope 3 emissions is 
optional. 
iSo 14064
The ISO 14064 standards for greenhouse gas accounting and 
verification published on 1 March 2006 by ISO (International 
Organization for Standardization) provide government and industry 
with an integrated set of tools for programmes aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, as well as for emissions trading.
ISO 14064 comprises three standards, respectively detailing 
specifications and guidance for the organisational and project levels, 
and for validation and verification. They can be used independently, 
or as an integrated set of tools to meet the varied needs of GHG 
accounting and verification. They are:
• ISO 14064-1:2006, Greenhouse gases – Part 1: Specification 
with guidance at the organization level for the quantification and 
reporting of greenhouse gas emissions and removals.
• ISO 14064-2:2006, Greenhouse gases – Part 2: Specification 
with guidance at the project level for the quantification, monitoring 
and reporting of greenhouse gas emission reductions and removal 
enhancements.
• ISO 14064-3:2006, Greenhouse gases – Part 3: Specification 
with guidance for the validation and verification of greenhouse gas 
assertions.
ISO 14064-1 provides no guidance on the categories for Scope 3 
accounting and reporting. 
www.iso.org/iso
ghg pRotocoL
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
and the World Resources Institute (WRI) have pioneered the 
development of GHG accounting and reporting standards. In their 
GHG protocol they identify a number of reasons for developing a GHG 
inventory:
• to manage GHG risks and identify opportunities
• to enable public reporting and participation in GHG programmes 
(voluntary, mandatory, registries, eco-labelling, GHG certifications)
• to enable participation in GHG markets (cap and trade 
programmes, carbon taxes).
The commitment to report publicly and participation in GHG markets 
are mechanisms to help motivate companies to understand and 
improve performance. But the most important thing for the ongoing 
success of the company is understanding the risks and opportunities 
associated with their GHG emissions. 
The most comprehensive guidance on Scope 3 accounting and 
reporting is a new document developed by WBCSD and WRI as a 
complement to the GHG protocol: Scope 3 Accounting and Reporting 
Standard: Supplement to the GHG Protocol Corporate Accounting and 
Reporting Standard.  
This document provides for the first time a detailed presentation 
of Scope 3 accounting and reporting. It covers all the aspects of 
accounting and reporting that are covered for Scope 1 and Scope 2 in 
the GHG Protocol as well as providing a comprehensive categorisation 
of Scope 3 emission types and detailed guidance on how to account 
and report on each category. The categories are:
indirect emissions from purchased products (upstream)
1. Purchased goods and services (cradle-to-gate emissions) (not 
otherwise included in categories 2 to 10)
2. Energy-related emissions (not included in Scope 2)
3. Capital equipment
4. Transportation and distribution
5. Waste generated in operations
6. Business travel
7. Franchises (not included in Scope 1 or 2) – reported by 
franchisee
8. Leased assets (not included in Scope 1 or 2) – reported by 
Lessee
9. Investments (not included in Scope 1 or 2)
10. Other
indirect emissions from sold products (downstream)
1. Franchises (not included in Scope 1 or 2 – reported by 
franchisor)
2. Leased assets (not included in Scope 1 or 2 – reported by 
lessor)
3. Distribution of sold products
4. Use of sold products
5. Disposal of sold products at the end of life
6. Other
other indirect emissions
1. Employee commuting
2. Other
This new Scope 3 standard provides accounting and reporting 
guidance according to the following process:
This new standard makes it possible to account and report on 
Scope 3 emissions in a comprehensive, consistent and comparable 
manner. However, while it addresses the difficulties of information 
gathering and the uncertainties associated with Scope 3 data, it does 
not provide definitive solutions to these issues. 
Review 
principles
Chapter 2
Define 
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More than 60 companies have completed the road testing of new 
global standards designed to help measure the greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions of their products and supply chains. The 62 companies 
from multiple sectors and 17 countries started road testing the 
standards in January 2010. In June, they submitted written feedback 
on their usability along with final GHG inventory reports. A summary 
of the feedback is posted on the GHG Protocol website.
The companies that road tested the Scope 3 accounting and reporting 
standard found it achievable to complete a Scope 3 inventory and 
many companies believe it practical to complete one on an annual 
basis. The road testers shared similar views on the business value 
of using the standards. Most road testers agree that the standards 
help in identifying GHG reduction opportunities and prioritising 
reduction efforts, engaging suppliers and enabling supply chain GHG 
management, understanding risks and opportunities associated with 
emissions in the supply chain, creating competitive advantage and 
product differentiation, and improving credibility and transparency in 
GHG reporting.
The publications will be published in 2011.
Companies that participated in the road testing exercise include: 
3M, Abengoa, Acer Inc, Airbus S.A.S, Akzonobel, Alcoa, Amcor, 
Ampacet, Anvil Knitwear, Inc., Autodesk, Inc., Baoshan Iron & 
Steel Co. Ltd, BASF SE, Belron International, Bloomberg LP, BT plc, 
Coca-Cola Erfrischungsgetränke AG, Danisco A/S, Deutsche Post 
DHL, Deutsche Telekom AG, DuPont, Ecolab, Ford Motor Company, 
General Electric, Gold’n Plump Poultry, LLC, Herman Miller, Inc, 
IKEA, Intertek, Italcementi Group, JohnsonDiversey, Kraft Foods, Kun 
Shan Tai ying Paint Co, Ltd., Lenovo, Levi Strauss & Co., Mitsubishi 
Chemical Corporation, national Grid, new Belgium Brewing¸ Ocean 
Spray Cranberries, Otarian, PE International, PepsiCo, Inc., Pfizer, 
Pinchin Environmental Ltd., PricewaterhouseCoopers (Hong Kong), 
Procter & Gamble Eurocor, Public Service Enterprise Group, Inc., 
Rogers Communications, SAP AG, SC Johnson, Shanghai Zidan 
Food Packaging and Printing Co., Ltd., Shell International Petroleum 
Company Ltd., Siemens AG, Suzano Pulp and Paper, Swire Beverages, 
TAL Apparel Limited, Tech-Front (Shanghai) Computer Co., Ltd. / 
Quanta Shanghai Manufacturing City, veolia Water, verso Paper Corp., 
Webcor Builders, WorldAutoSteel.
Dnv, KPMG, and PwC provided support to road test the 3rd party 
assurance guidance.
http://www.ghgprotocol.org 
cDSb RepoRting FRAmewoRK
The Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB) was formed in 
2007 in response to increasing demands for standardised reporting 
guidelines on the inclusion of climate change information in 
mainstream reports.
CDSB works to develop a globally accepted framework, based on 
existing standards, for corporate reporting on climate change. 
As it is to be used for the disclosure of information in mainstream 
reports, the CDSB framework aims as far as possible to adopt and 
reflect principles established for financial reporting. CDSB endorses 
and shares the International Accounting Standard Board’s (IASB) aim 
of establishing, advancing, maintaining and improving standards of 
financial and related reporting in the public interest.
CDSB’s framework:
• states that preparation of greenhouse gas emissions disclosures 
should be based on the Greenhouse Gas Protocol: A Corporate 
Accounting and Reporting Standard (Revised Edition) developed 
by WBCSD and WRI and/or any Regional or national Program 
Protocol based on the Greenhouse Gas Protocol and/or the 
International Organisation for Standardisation’s ISO 14064-1 
‘Specification with guidance at the organisational level for 
quantification and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions and 
removals’
• aligns as far as possible with relevant aspects of International 
Financial Reporting Standards.
• is being developed with organisations leading work in mainstream 
reporting and climate change-related disclosure.
The CDSB Climate Change Reporting Framework (CCRF) 1.0  will be 
published at the end of August 2010.
www.cdsb-global.org 
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ExxonMobil is a very successful company with an excellent record 
of technological innovation. It sets the industry benchmark for 
operational efficiency. After choosing not to participate in the 
CDP for a number of years, when it did decide to do so, it did 
so comprehensively, providing credible data. And yet, in spite of 
providing a lengthy and detailed Carbon Disclosure report, it has only 
scored 62 on the CDP Leaders’ Index. 
ExxonMobil states its position as follows:
• We do not report Scope 3 emissions. This should be a 
conditional question. 
• Calculating GHG emissions from specific petroleum products 
is straightforward. However, identifying which fuel sales are 
attributed to which member of the petroleum industry is difficult 
because the supply system for crude and petroleum products is 
complex, with multiple changes of ownership. 
• We believe that there is no simple way to account for these 
business transfers to estimate emissions from ‘ExxonMobil’ 
products. ExxonMobil believes that producers, refiners, 
distributors, and end-users should each be responsible for 
managing and reporting the emissions generated from activities 
under their control. To this end, we are taking actions to 
reduce emissions from our own operations and are working on 
technologies to help consumers reduce their emissions.
exxonmobil 2009 cDp accounting and reporting
Scope 1 131,000,000 
Scope 2 14,000,000 
Scope 3 0 
Total Scope 1 & 2 145,000,000
ExxonMobil plays to its existing strengths and focuses on operations 
and technology. It does recognise a range of risks associated with GHG 
emissions. However, many of these are regulatory and political. It is 
concerned about:
• political instability or lack of well-established and reliable legal 
systems in areas where the corporation operates
•  other political developments and laws and regulations, such as 
expropriation or forced divestiture of assets, unilateral cancellation 
or modification of contract terms, and regulation of certain energy 
markets
•  laws and regulations related to environmental or energy security 
matters, including those addressing alternative energy sources, 
technology standards and the risks of global climate change
•  restrictions on exploration, production, imports and exports
•  restrictions on the Corporation’s ability to do business with certain 
countries, or to engage in certain areas of business within a country
• price controls
•  tax or royalty increases, including retroactive claims
• war or other international conflicts
• civil unrest.
All of these are valid and require appropriate response. But they are 
also regulatory and political risks associated with their core operations 
and not with how their products are used or the fact that their business 
is based on a non-renewable resource.  
In addition they look at two types of environmental risk, first the 
potential risk to their operations caused by changes in climate and 
second the risks to society and ecosystems. The environmental risks to 
operations that they identify are limited to severe weather events that 
may disrupt supplies or interrupt the operations of ExxonMobil facilities. 
Its approach to managing these risks are the business as usual 
strategies that they have been following for years and include:
•  incorporation of understanding of risk into design, construction and 
operation of exposed facilities
•  early and coordinated action to respond rapidly and effectively
•  business continuity and emergency response plans to protect the 
safety of our employees and operations 
•  worse-case scenario emergency response exercises to practice 
coordination and logistical response, and propose upgrades to 
standard processes and contingency plans.
All of this is good, sound risk management practice. However, 
innovation is essentially management systems and technology based 
and has little to do with their business model, the products they 
produce or how they are used – the upstream and downstream parts of 
the value chain. As ExxonMobil says in their CDP disclosure:
‘Technological, political, and regulatory risks have been inherent in 
the oil and gas industry since its earliest beginnings. ExxonMobil will 
respond to these uncertainties and developments using our traditional 
approach: disciplined planning and investment, financial strength, 
efficient and reliable operations, and research and development... 
ExxonMobil’s strength in management systems provides us an ongoing 
opportunity to comply with emerging regulations in a manner that is 
more efficient and provides an economic advantage with respect to 
competitors.’
Exxon is very good at what it does. It has systematically worked to 
improve efficiency and environmental performance throughout its 
facilities worldwide. Since 2000, it has identified ways to improve 
energy efficiency at its refineries and chemical plants by 15 to 20 
percent. It has invested more than $5bn in natural gas utilisation and 
commercialisation projects that will help reduce the routine flaring 
of natural gas that is a by-product of oil production. Its technological 
innovation gives it the ability to deliver new solutions and to invest in 
unconventional resources.  
Exxon’s strategy is based on their view that oil and gas will be part 
of the energy mix for a long time to come – even as its share of the 
energy market declines. Their strategy is to be the leading player in a 
declining market. 
ExxonMobil also recognises that risks to society and ecosystems could 
be significant. They do accept that any approach to meeting the world’s 
growing energy need will incorporate strategies to address the risk of 
climate change. They recognise that there are two things that need to 
be done: stabilise emissions at a level that will reduce the risk of severe 
climate change and invest in adaptation strategies, those strategies that 
will allow us to respond effectively to climate changes. 
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In Exxon’s view ‘international and national attention has turned to focus 
on adaptation as a strategy to mitigate risk’. What it is saying is that in 
its view it is too expensive and economically disruptive to put in place 
policies and strategies to reduce emissions levels to 450ppm so let’s 
accept that we will not reach this target and instead invest in measures 
that respond to the severe changes when they happen. Its primary 
concern is for the implications for economic growth and quality of life. 
Still, it has a reputational risk to consider and so it accepts the 
risks to society and ecosystems from increases in GHG emissions 
are significant. It therefore accepts that it is prudent to develop and 
implement strategies that address these risks, keeping in mind the 
central importance of energy to the economies of the world. 
ExxonMobil has therefore decided to invest in the development of 
new technologies to the extent that covers its reputational risk. So 
ExxonMobil was the founding sponsor of the Global Climate and Energy 
Project (GCEP) at Stanford University. GCEP is looking at a range of 
alternative energy sources including solar photovoltaic devices, fuel 
cells and bioelectric conversion of energy, lithium-ion batteries for 
applications in vehicles, engines that produce higher efficiency and 
lower emissions, producing biodiesel fuel from bacteria to achieve a 
twentyfold increase in energy yield, and strategies for using hydrogen to 
power vehicles.
For ExxonMobil the conclusion behind their existing strategy is that 
Scope 3 emissions information is not material. They have a strategy in 
place that does not require that information. 
 
Suggested earlier in this study is that Wal-Mart’s ranking in CDP 
2009 seems somewhat anomalous in relation to Scope 3 emissions 
accounting and reporting. At 89, Wal-Mart had the 4th highest score of 
the Global 500 and yet it did not report any Scope 3 emissions data. 
How do we explain this?
The explanation comes through an analysis of its work on GHG 
emissions in their supply chain. It has reported significant activity with 
its supply chain. One would expect that in order to make the decision to 
invest in this way it would have supporting data and analyses. It may 
well have. But it has chosen not to report it at this time. 
The anomaly is that it is making decisions about upstream GHG 
associated risks and opportunities as if it had Scope 3 data and yet, if 
it has it, it has chosen not to report it. Let’s look at what Wal-Mart has 
accounted for and reported on. 
Wal-Mart 2009 cDp accounting and reporting
Scope 1 5,566,006 
Scope 2 15,500,950 
Scope 3 0 
Total Scope 1 & 2 21,066,956
Although Wal-Mart has not reported on its Scope 3 emissions it has 
qualified this. It states that it recognises the importance of supply 
chain carbon management and has been engaging its suppliers on 
sustainability since 2005. It further states that although the company 
is not reporting supply chain emissions for 2008, using preliminary 
macro-economic assessments, it believes that its supply chain is likely 
to have an annual carbon footprint that is at least 100 times greater 
than its total Scope 1 and 2 emissions. 
Wal-Mart recognises the significance of Scope 3 emissions. It has 
studied them in some detail but does not yet feel it is in a position to 
report credible data. It is, however, willing to state an estimate of the 
scale of the emissions. This is very important because this information 
has begun to influence the decision it makes. 
Wal-Mart has developed what it calls its ‘Sustainability 360’ platform. 
This approach takes into account its supply chain, the products it sells, 
their associates, and the communities where it operates and sources. 
It enables it to establish new ways of doing everyday business, build 
innovative solutions to some of the greatest issues facing our global 
supply chain and continue to save our customers around the world 
money on quality products. 
Given the scale of supply chain emissions Wal-Mart has chosen to 
concentrate there. It is working with suppliers to make its products 
more sustainable, as well as helping them become more sustainable 
businesses. Wal-Mart’s strategy is using its market position to influence 
the product innovation and better environmental performance up and 
down its supply system.
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In September 2007, it conducted a pilot project with the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) and seven Wal-Mart supplier sectors to 
measure energy use and emissions up and down the supply chain. 
Through the pilot, which included DvDs, toothpaste, soap, beer, 
milk, vacuum cleaners and soda product categories, suppliers 
measured carbon emissions throughout each product’s lifecycle which 
produced significant learnings. During 2008, Wal-Mart, CDP and 
other stakeholders evaluated the pilot results and are now preparing 
for the next phase that will incorporate more product categories into 
the analysis.
Wal-Mart also states that in future it will account for and report on 
Scope 3 emissions for the up and downstream components of its 
business, since it is, as it says, critical elements of the retail value chain 
and represents additional opportunities to manage carbon emissions.
This strategy of concentrating on the supply chain has resulted in a 
number of successes. 
Wal-Mart has developed a Supplier Energy Efficiency Program (SEEP) 
that enables low-cost technology transfer throughout its supply network. 
It made a commitment to sell 100 million compact fluorescent light 
bulbs (CFLs) at Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club locations by the end of 
2007 but in fact sold 137 million. As of 2009 it had sold more than 
260 million CFLs. Wal-Mart claims that the avoided emissions from 
this initiative alone are approximately four times greater than its entire 
annual global footprint.
Every air conditioner Wal-Mart sells in the US will be EnERGy 
STAR®-rated by 2010. As of January 31, 2009, 75 percent of air 
conditioners were EnERGy STAR®-rated.
Wal-Mart worked with its suppliers to make the most energy intensive 
products in its stores, anywhere in the world, 25 percent more 
energy-efficient by January 2011. It is focusing on personal computers, 
video game consoles, air conditioners and televisions, among others. 
It has committed to doubling the sale of products in the US that help 
make homes more energy-efficient by 2011. Products falling under this 
category include caulk, weather stripping, air filters, programmable 
thermostats, expanding foam and power strips. Between the beginning 
of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 it had increased sales by more 
than 25 percent.
It has committed to reducing packaging by five percent globally by 
2013. It has collected packaging information on approximately 90 
percent of the products carried in Sam’s Club and 300,000 items sold 
at Wal-Mart stores. 
It is partnering with the top-200 supplier factories in China to improve 
energy efficiency by 20 percent per unit of production by the end of 
2012. By the end of 2008 Wal-Mart China was on track with its first 
energy-efficiency pilot with more than 100 factories. 
In addition, Wal-Mart has broadened supply chain work beyond carbon 
emissions. In July 2009 it announced a supply chain sustainability 
index programme. Working with a group called the Sustainability 
Consortium, it has developed a 15-question tool that will be sent to 
every one of their more than 100,000 suppliers. Suppliers must provide 
information on and be ranked on their performance in four areas:
• energy and climate 
• natural resources 
• material efficiency 
• people and community. 
Work in the area of energy and climate has now influenced work in 
other social and environmental areas and has become a driver of 
innovation.
Wal-Mart first began following this pathway when it began to look at 
packaging. It was motivated by the need to reduce cost and reducing 
packaging was a way to reduce cost. In the process it found that it was 
easier to talk about sustainability than about cost reductions. There 
were sustainability benefits as well as cost benefits. It found a market 
driver and began to look for more sustainability benefits. 
Much of the strategy is focused on improved efficiency within its supply 
chain. To an extent, this simply pushes the improved efficiency strategy 
down the chain. Is it really a strategy that addresses the fundamental 
changes demanded by the low-carbon economy? At the beginning, 
perhaps not. But the process that Wal-Mart has initiated in its supply 
chain appears to have created a sense of partnership that has now 
moved into more interesting areas of product suitability and design. As 
lifecycle analysis begins to penetrate this process of product analysis 
we can hope to see more significant innovation.
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Bayer is right at the top of the CD Leaders’ Index with a score of 95. 
This successful company has reported on all CDP areas of Scope 3 
emissions and has built the reduction of carbon emissions into the very 
core of its business strategy. 
Bayer goes well beyond risk identification and mitigation. To a large 
extent, its strategy is built on climate-related opportunities. It knows 
what the numbers are and has a sound foundation for innovation and 
strategic decision making. 
Bayer 2009 cDp accounting and reporting
Scope 1 4,000,000 
Scope 2 3,570,000 
Scope 3 21,900,000 
Total Scope 1 & 2 7,570,000
Total with Scope 3 29,470,000
Scope 3 as % of total 74.3%
These numbers are consistent with the example of typical emissions 
published in the Scope 3 supplement to the GHG protocol published 
by WBCSD and WRI (see Appendix B). Close to 75% of emissions are 
Scope 3.
In its CDP report, Bayer has stated: ‘Bayer considers climate change 
one of today’s megatrends. The identification of opportunities arising 
from this trend is an integral part of Bayer’s strategy process. 
Climate-change-related opportunities are identified and substantiated 
at the subgroup and business unit level and then assessed from 
the perspective of the Bayer Group as a whole. In parallel, the 
Bayer Climate Programme Steering Committee identifies business 
opportunities and connects different subgroups and business units in 
case of opportunities that apply to several organisational units in the 
Bayer group. The Bayer Climate Programme Steering Committee is led 
by Dr Wolfgang Plischke, the member of the Board of Management 
responsible for Innovation, Technology and Environment.’
Bayer has made a huge investment in carbon-related R&D. It has set 
aside €1bn in its budget for investment in climate-related R&D and 
other projects between 2008 and 2010.
While Bayer has been very successful in the reduction of its 
production-related Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions and will continue on 
this path under the umbrella of its Bayer Climate Programme, Bayer 
recognises the risks that could result from GHG emissions beyond the 
scope of its own operations. It is also continuously looking for ways to 
reduce Scope 3 emissions.
ChArT 11: ExAMPLE GhG EMISSIONS ACrOSS A PrODUCT’S LIFECyCLE
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It makes efforts to reduce business travel where feasible, in particular 
flights by substituting business travel if possible with phone calls, 
video, or internet conferencing. With its ‘EcoFleet’ initiative, Bayer has 
launched a campaign to significantly reduce CO2 emissions caused by 
company vehicles, ensured by a group-wide Bayer car policy.
For cost and environmental reasons, Bayer focuses on energy efficiency 
in both external and internal distribution/logistics, by transporting 
bulk material by pipeline, water or rail when feasible. These means of 
transport are economical and cause relatively low GHG emissions.
The emissions within Bayer’s supply chain are caused by the extraction, 
production and transportation of materials/goods before they are 
supplied to Bayer. Feedstock based on crude oil as well as natural 
gas and coal for electricity and steam generation contribute by far the 
largest share to Bayer’s total supply chain emissions. 
Beyond the regular monitoring of emissions using BaySIS, Bayer has 
developed the ‘Bayer Climate Check’. With this tool, it has become 
possible for the first time to evaluate not only the production plant 
itself but also all the raw materials and energy needed for production 
together with logistics up to the factory gate. 
The Bayer Climate Check is complemented by Bayer’s innovative 
energy management system STRUCTese that Bayer developed in 2008 
and is currently rolling out at all major production sites. STRUCTese is 
a real-time controlling instrument that creates transparency on energy 
losses, enables a performance dialogue on energy consumption on all 
levels within the company and therefore ensures a focus on increasing 
energy efficiency. 
Bayer has positioned itself over the past few years as a ‘climate 
solution provider’, while at the same time delivering a contribution to 
the reduction of GHG emissions. The climate-change-related business 
opportunities have particularly been identified in Bayer subgroups 
and service companies: Bayer Material Science, Bayer Crop Science 
and Bayer Technology Services are able to benefit the most from the 
mitigation and adaptation requirements that arise in the market. 
Across all GHG-emitting sectors (buildings, transport, power, industry 
and agriculture/forestry), Bayer provides ‘climate solutions’ that reduce 
GHG emissions and thus help to mitigate the impact of climate change. 
For example, about 20% of Bayer Material Science revenue comes from 
climate-change-related business (ie about €2bn in 2008). 
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The building sector contributes 21% to global GHG emissions (including 
energy supplied by power sector). Major sources of emissions are 
heating, hot water, appliances (eg refrigerators) and lighting. The 
single most important lever to reduce GHG emissions is improved 
insulation. Also, more efficient cooling units and lighting can contribute 
significantly to GHG reduction. Bayer has ‘climate solutions’ in place 
that address all of the above-mentioned abatement levers. These 
solutions are also bundled in Bayer’s project ‘EcoCommercial Building’ 
(ECB), which is a global concept for climate-friendly commercial and 
industrial buildings. 
Within the building sector, Bayer contributes to three main applications 
that address the GHG-abatement levers insulation, cooling and lighting.
polyurethane insulation in buildings
With its polyurethane raw materials Baymer® and Desmodur®, Bayer 
is optimally positioned to benefit from the trend towards increased 
insulation in construction. 
insulation for refrigeration
With its polyurethane raw materials optimised for use in refrigeration, 
Bayer supports the manufacturers of household refrigerators and cooling 
devices for retail stores. With its brands Baytherm®, Baydur®, and 
Desmodur®, Bayer is able to provide products with excellent insulation 
and physical properties for use in cooling devices. 
transparent materials for LeD technology
The increasing demand for energy-efficient solutions is driving the 
development of LED technology. Because of its superior performance 
properties and energy efficiency, LED technology is increasingly used in 
several applications. 
The transport sector contributes 14% to global GHG emissions. Major 
sources of emissions are passenger cars and trucks. With its products, 
Bayer addresses two major abatement levers in the transport sector: 
‘lightweighting’ and biofuels. Bayer products include:
•  lightweighting materials in car manufacturing
• plant protection products for energy crops
•  high-yielding varieties for the production of biofuels. 
The industry sector contributes 34% to global GHG emissions 
(including energy supplied by power sector). Major sources of emissions 
are production processes in the chemicals, steel, cement and mineral 
oil industries. Bayer offers products that reduce emissions of production 
processes (eg ultraviolet coatings) and that contribute towards a 
‘greener’ supply chain (eg natural oil polyols).
The power sector contributes 24% to global GHG emissions. Sources 
of GHG emissions are the generation of electricity and steam from 
fossil fuels (eg lignite and hard coal). The use of renewable energies 
is a key lever to reduce the GHG footprint of the power sector. Bayer 
is supporting the expansion of renewable energies. Examples of Bayer 
products in this context are:
• carbon nanotubes for wind power
•  polyurethanes for photovoltaic modules and mounting systems.
The agriculture/forestry sector contributes 31% to global GHG 
emissions (including land use change). Major sources of GHG 
emissions include deforestation and livestock. An important abatement 
lever is the creation of additional carbon sinks. Bayer is currently 
working on new products/services in the fields of stress tolerance and 
carbon sequestration. 
Beyond these examples, Bayer has a pipeline of products at different 
stages of development, all providing solutions to help customers 
increase their energy efficiency or reduce their carbon footprint. 
When we combine the lack of political leadership with the clear 
evidence provided by McKinsey that the technological fix is not going to 
get us where we need to go it is clear that business must take the lead 
in inventing the low-carbon economy and that a credible and complete 
carbon accounting that includes a full Scope 3 inventory is an essential 
ingredient in the business decision making and innovation process. It is 
equally clear that the people with the skills to account for and analyse 
carbon emissions have an important role to play.
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